.sig blob — the complete WIN_CERTIFICATE structure (8-byte header + PKCS#7 SignedData). Use ZenCert inject or sign to apply this to another PE binary.
.crt (DER) — just the leaf X.509 certificate in binary DER format. Inspect with: certutil -dump file.crt openssl x509 -inform DER -in file.crt -text
Good donor sources:
Any Microsoft-signed system binary, signed drivers, or Office binaries chains to an MS root and passes WDAC default policy. See the WDAC Guide tab for specific paths.
Truncate Signature
Drop signed binary here
What Truncate Does
Zeros the IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY certificate table entry, truncates the appended cert blob, and recalculates the PE checksum. The output binary is structurally valid but unsigned.
Quick Check
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Result
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MSI Inspect
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MSI Result
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WDAC Trust Model
WDAC default policy trusts three categories:
1. Binaries signed by Microsoft (cert chains to an MS root CA)
2. WHQL-signed kernel-mode drivers
3. Windows Store apps via SI policy
Injecting a Microsoft cert into your binary satisfies WDAC publisher rules because Windows only checks the cert chain structure in the appended PKCS#7 — it does not re-verify the hash of the signed content when the goal is publisher matching (vs integrity verification).
SmartScreen — why your signed output is still flagged
SmartScreen uses file reputation (SHA-256 hash of the binary), not cert presence. Injecting a cert does not transfer reputation because the file's hash is different from the original donor.
To bypass SmartScreen: use an EV code signing cert (immediate trust), or build download reputation with an OV cert over time.
Even injecting an ntdll.dll cert will be SmartScreen-flagged on first run — the hash is unknown to Microsoft's reputation service.
Recommended MS-Signed Donors
These binaries chain to a known Microsoft Root CA and pass WDAC default policy when their cert is injected.
Path
Signer
Root
Known Microsoft Root CA Thumbprints
A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419 — Microsoft Root Authority
3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5 — MS Root CA 2010
8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE — MS Root CA 2011
58120E84B10B4CC582EB0CA1F9B4E35F82E3D21D — MS Code Verification Root
06491B7FE3A9F46B20FC9027A72D97B4AB0B7534 — MS Authenticode Root
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